I examine the frictions of financial distress, information asymmetry, agency costs, and taxes and the effects they have on observed cash positions of small firms. Firms with higher costs of financial distress, as measured by the amount of research and development conducted by the firm, hold more cash. Firms with greater leverage tend to hold more cash for preventative purposes. Firms perceiving greater information asymmetries when they need money in the future hold more cash relative to firms perceiving a lesser degree of information asymmetry. This is in contrast to firms that have had difficulty in the past raising capital who have lower cash holdings, suggesting that these firms may be operating below their optimal cash position. Older firms carry more cash, even though they should have better access to capital in the future. Cash holdings decrease with size, suggesting economies of scale in the benefits of cash. I also find support for managerial ownership having an effect on cash holdings, but that taxes have no impact.
Introduction
In a Modigliani-Miller world, cash holdings are a zero net present value investment. Under perfect capital markets, capital is always available to fund positive NPV projects since there are no information asymmetries, taxes, or transaction costs.
Thus holding cash has no benefits. There are no costs to holding cash either since there are no agency costs leading to free cash being invested in negative NPV projects for the private benefit of the manager. Nor are there transaction costs, taxes, or mispricings that make holding cash costly.
There has been a thorough examination of the determinants of capital structure outside an M&M world but many of the same frictions have received relatively little attention regarding their effects on cash holdings. This lack of attention is striking considering the role that cash holdings play in terms of dividend policy, hedging, and incremental capital structure decisions. Dividend policy is certainly affected by the liquidity of the firm since it is the extra liquidity that is being returned to shareholders that make up a dividend. With respect to hedging to guard against financial distress, the purpose of a hedging strategy is theoretically to provide cash in states of the world in which the firm is short of liquid assets. Finally, decisions to raise capital certainly are affected by the amount of liquidity within the firm since it is when internal funds are lacking that the raising of additional funds, and the choice of the appropriate security, is done. Therefore examining the role of cash outside an M&M world, where frictions do exist, is relevant to understanding dividend policy, hedging, and capital structure.
A few others, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and Harford (1999) , have empirically examined the determinants of cash holdings for large, publicly traded firms. These same issues have not been examined for small firms. This paper seeks to fill that void by measuring the cash levels of small firms and examining which factors impact the cash positions of these firms. I compare my results to those of other papers to determine which effects are robust to differences is size and ownership structure. I also document areas in which the results differ from those found when looking at larger firms, suggesting that the relative tradeoffs change with size and/or ownership structure.
The advantage of looking at small businesses is that the effects of these frictions have effects that should be magnified, and therefore more easily documented, relative to larger firms. For these smaller firms, information asymmetries are generally larger and can lead to outright credit rationing whereas larger firms are more likely to simply face a mispricing. Transactions costs are also expected to be a relatively larger obstacle for smaller firms compared to larger ones since there is an economies of scale element to transactions costs. Additionally, smaller firms have more varied ownership structures, which allows for a better examination of the agency costs element of cash holdings because for some firms in the sample, there is no distinction between the owner and the manager. The other contribution of this paper is that, because I use survey data, I can control for the stated concerns regarding the firm's financial policy, as described by the managers in the survey, as opposed to using a financial proxy.
Specifically, I examine the frictions of information asymmetry, financial distress, agency costs, and taxes and the effect they have on observed cash positions of firms. I find many of these elements do indeed affect the amount of cash that firms hold. Firms that state that they perceive encountering greater difficulty raising capital, theoretically due to information asymmetry, when they need money in the future hold more cash relative to firms perceiving a lesser degree of difficulty. This is in contrast to firms that have had problems in the past raising capital who have lower cash holdings, suggesting that these firms may be operating below their optimal cash position. Also consistent with this finding is that older firms carry more cash, even though they should have better access to capital in the future. Another finding is that cash holdings appear to decrease with size, suggesting economies of scale in the benefits of cash. Moving on to factors measuring expected costs of financial distress, as the amount of research and development conducted by the firm increases, they tend to hold more cash. Additionally, firms with greater leverage tend to hold more cash for preventative purposes. I find some support for agency costs having an effect on cash holdings, but that taxes have no impact.
The next section reviews the recent empirical literature related to cash holdings. Section 3 describes the data and provides summary statistics. The fourth section describes the regressions and presents the results while Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review
Outside an M&M world, information asymmetries, agency costs, transactions costs, and taxes are present so there are costs and benefits to holding cash, thereby making the cash holdings decision relevant. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest a role for cash holdings given information asymmetries between the market and a firm. Due to mispricings that may result from such asymmetries, positive NPV projects are only invested in when cash within the firm is available. Therefore, cash holdings increase firm value because positive NPV projects are taken despite mispricings that alternatively would cause the project to be passed up. One would expect the level of cash holdings to increase as the degree of information asymmetry increases, since such asymmetry may be positively correlated with the degree of mispricing faced by the firm when it attempts to raise capital. This is consistent with the Myers (1977) pecking order theory to the financing of projects, as firms prefer internal cash to raising funds externally.
There are potentially transactions costs associated with raising capital in external markets that are avoided by using internally generated cash. Petersen and Rajan (2000) find that among the firms in this survey, the fees incurred in obtaining funds through borrowing were uncorrelated with the size of the loan, indicating that such fees are a fixed dollar amount. Thus, there are economies of scale in raising funds, suggesting that larger firms may hold relatively less cash than smaller firms. Since the projects of larger firms are probably larger than those of relatively smaller firms, the return that is needed to offset the fixed transaction cost is decreasing in the size of the firm. This suggests that smaller firms are forgoing projects with higher returns than those foregone by larger firms when the binding constraint is transactions costs, giving them greater benefits from holding cash.
There are also costs associated with holding cash. Jensen (1986) suggests that free cash in a firm makes it easier for managers to pursue negative NPV projects that provide the manager with a private benefit. Using internal cash averts going to the capital markets where such projects are scrutinized, resulting in managers that need not be as disciplined regarding their choice of projects. Therefore, large cash holdings potentially destroy shareholder value as the likelihood of taking on a negative NPV project increases with larger cash balances.
Another potential cost from holding cash is due to taxes. If a firm is holding cash rather than returning that cash to equity holders, the after-tax return on the cash may be less than what investors could have earned by investing the cash themselves. Such cash, at least amongst larger firms, is generally invested in money markets or short-term liquid bond investments that are also available to individual investors if they held the cash themselves. However, the earnings on cash held by the firm are double taxed, first at the corporate level then again at the individual level. Alternatively, individuals would only face taxation once on such holdings. Double taxation therefore destroys shareholder value relative to investors holding the cash themselves. This is the reverse of the debt tax shield. Since borrowing creates a tax shield, then investing in such securities creates a tax penalty.
Thus optimal cash positions balance the marginal benefits of holding extra cash with the potential costs of having more cash.
Two recent papers have examined cash holdings of large firms. The paper most similar to this is Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) , which examines the determinants of cash holdings amongst publicly traded firms over the period 1971-1994. Similar to my results, they find that firms with higher costs of financial distress, as measured by expenditures on research and development divided by sales and by the market-to-book ratio, hold more cash and that relative cash holdings decline with size.
Contrary to my results, they find that firms with greater leverage hold less cash. They also find that firms facing greater information asymmetries, measured as firms not having a debt rating, hold more cash, which is consistent with my results. These differences suggest that there may be significant differences in the relative costs and benefits of cash 6 holdings between the two groups. It is these differences that I explore in detail within the paper and will further analyze these differences when the results are presented. One other relevant finding in Opler et al. is that using time series data, they determine that cash holdings seem persistent and that large changes in excess cash are usually associated with operating losses. This finding is consistent with the insurance-type benefit of holding cash.
A second recent paper that examines cash holdings, concentrating more on how they are used, is Harford (1999) . He also looks at Compustat firms, measuring their cash holdings relative to a measure of expected cash holdings for the specific industry in which the firm operates, controlling for such variables as size, market-to-book, cashflow from operations, and cashflow variability. Using the deviation from expected holdings as a measure of cash richness, he then analyzes the agency costs associated with cash richness. Specifically, he looks at the likelihood of entering into an acquisition and the correlation between cash rich firms and the market response to the acquisition announcement, finding that on average, cash rich firms enter into acquisitions that destroy firm value and lead to abnormal declines in operating performance. That paper is related to this one, as he also finds evidence of agency costs related to cash holdings.
The literature has mostly focused on issues affecting a firm's demand for cash.
However, a firm's observed cash position is not just a function of these demand elements, as there is also a function describing the supply of cash available to a firm. Thus the cash holdings we observe are an interaction of these two forces. Firms may be operating below their optimal cash position because of past mispricings and outright credit rationing, the same frictions that cash holdings serve to guard against. Therefore, I also attempt to measure "supply-side" frictions such as the ability to access credit in the past.
While the empirical literature has so far given little attention to the effects that past capital access may have on a firm's cash position, it is important to include these controls when examining smaller firms where outright credit rationing may be more prevalent.
Data
The source of the data for this paper is the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance conducted by the Federal Reserve. This is a survey of 4,637 for-profit non-financial, non-farm businesses with fewer than 500 employees. I restrict my analysis 
Empirical Findings
This section presents the results of multivariate analyses of the effects of costs of information asymmetry, financial distress, agency costs, and taxes on the cash position of a firm. Table 3 presents the results of regressing on the ratio of cash to sales those variables that may have implications regarding the firm's demand for cash. Not surprisingly, many of the same factors that affect a firm's choice of capital structure also enter into the firm's cash holdings decision, consistent with the benefits and costs of holding cash arising from the same frictions.
A. Asymmetric Information
One group of firms that theoretically has a higher marginal benefit to holding cash, and should therefore hold more cash are those firms with larger information asymmetry problems. As the market knows less about a firm, all else equal, the firm would have a more difficult time raising cash when they need it, or may have to pay a higher price for those funds in order to overcome the information asymmetry problem.
The asymmetry leads to these firms being bundled with low quality firms and paying a subsequently higher interest rate, as suggested in Diamond (1991) . However, these same firms which may want to hold more cash due to a perceived information asymmetry in the future may also have had difficulty raising cash in the past, and may therefore actually hold less cash. Such firms receive a higher benefit from holding cash but may face larger supply problems, effectively keeping them further from their optimal cash position. Therefore, I will look at variables that have demand and supply components to them in analyzing the effects of information asymmetry on cash holdings. Table 3 looks exclusively at those variables that are hypothesized to have implications on the demand side of the cash holdings determination. In a world with perfect capital markets, including elements associated with the supply of cash would be irrelevant. However, information asymmetries do exist making these variables important in determining the structure of cash holdings, and are therefore included in the regressions presented in Table 4 .
Within the survey, firms were asked what they "think will be the most important issue affecting [the] firm over the next 12 months." Firms that respond that "credit availability" is the most important issue should theoretically hold more cash since they would receive a higher marginal benefit from cash. These firms perceive a greater degree of information asymmetry between themselves and the credit market and as such, feel that they would have a comparatively more difficult time raising capital when they need it. Also, since credit conditions are indeed a concern, these firms are ones that anticipate having a need to raise capital in the next twelve months. I therefore control for these firms using a dummy variable indicating which firms characterize the credit market conditions as their most important issue in the succeeding twelve months.
These firms do hold more cash as hypothesized. In Table 3 , the coefficient is positive, yet statistically insignificant. However, this variable may not just be picking up an appraisal of future access to capital, but may be correlated with past capital market access conditions. Appraisals of difficulty in accessing capital in the future should lead such firms to have higher demands for cash, whereas past difficulties in accessing capital would lead to a lower supply of available cash, and to such firms operating further below their optimal cash position.
Therefore, I add variables that may affect the supply of cash available to a firm, all of which represent different types of information asymmetries. By adding these controls, I seek to separate out the demand element that should theoretically have a positive effect on cash, from the supply elements, which should correspond to lower cash balances. The three categories are firms with comparatively better access, firms who have had past difficulty, and firms with past credit problems. The regressions presented in Table 4 contain these controls.
The first set of control variables are for those firms who may have had comparatively better access to capital. These firms may hold less cash since they should also have fewer problems in the future when they need to raise it, which is implicitly a demand effect. Alternatively, such firms may hold more cash relative to the rest of the sample since these firms should have had less difficulty in raising capital in the past and therefore are operating closer to their optimal cash position. Opler et al. used as their measure of information asymmetry a variable that I would argue fits in this category.
They use whether the firm has a debt rating, which is a measure of those firms which have succeeded in raising capital in the public debt market in the past, since this is the reason such firms have a debt rating. They find a significantly negative coefficient and interpret the variable as evidence that firms with less of an information asymmetry demand less cash. I use similar variables measuring past access but differentiate them from measures of perceived future access in order to separate demand for cash effects from those having an affect on the supply of available cash.
The first variable controls for those firms that indicated they had been solicited by a financial institution in the last year regarding a new loan or line of credit. This occurred for 34.6% of the sample and presumably such firms undergo a screening process prior to such solicitations indicating a lesser degree of information asymmetry between the market and firm for this group. The second control is for those firms that are publicly traded, which is the case for 1.1% of the firms in the sample. Certainly these firms have a lesser degree of information asymmetry since such firms face stricter disclosure requirements and they have undergone all the disclosures associated with the initial public offering. If indeed the supply of cash restricts the cash position of firms, I would expect these variables to have significantly positive coefficients.
The second group of supply side variables are measures of difficulty in the past in accessing credit or equity markets. If there are frictions affecting the availability of capital and it is the firms with the most difficulty accessing credit that are most affected, then it should be these firms that show the largest deviations from their optimal cash position. The first such measure that I consider are those firms that when asked "how much of a problem were credit market conditions to the firm during the last 12 months," responded that they were a "serious problem". This was the case for 15.3% of the firms in the sample. The second measure is for those firms that were declined on their most recent loan application. Seven percent of the firms in the sample applied for a loan in the three years prior to the survey and were turned down on the most recent application. A final variable regarding past credit access that I consider, is a control variable for those firms that did not apply for credit that needed funds, but thought they would be turned down. Of the 2800 firms in my sample, 682 of them (24.4%) at some time in the three years prior to the sample needed credit but did not apply. These three variables all correspond to firms that have had some difficulty raising funds recently that would negatively impact their cash position.
The third set of variables I examine are measures of past credit problems by either the owner or the firm. These measures of poor credit use in the past may have a detrimental impact on past and future credit applications. Such factors may increase demand for cash holdings because raising cash in the future may be difficult, however such firms may also be operating below their optimal cash position because these same variables hindered the firm's effectiveness in reaching their optimal position. The four credit worthiness variables are from four survey questions regarding the handling of credit in the past that may be reflected in a credit report. The first of them asks if the owner or the firm has declared bankruptcy in the past seven years, to which approximately three percent reply in the affirmative. The second variable controls for the approximately ten percent of firms in the sample which reply that the owner has had personal delinquencies exceeding sixty days in the past three years. The third variable indicates which of the twenty-one percent of firms responded that the firm has been delinquent in excess of sixty days within the past three years. The fourth variable controls for the 4.4% of firms whose owners have had judgments rendered against them in the past three years.
When these different supply elements are added to the regressions, the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating those firms who listed future credit market conditions as their greatest concern is now significantly positive, in the OLS specification. An estimated coefficient of 2.16% is economically significant as well, as it suggests that firms anticipating future difficulty in obtaining capital when they need it, controlling for past access to capital, hold additional cash equivalent to 2.16% of sales. This estimate is relative to average cash holdings of 7.1% of sales, meaning that these firms hold on average 30% more cash than firms that do not list credit market conditions as their primary concern.
Many of the supply variables are statistically significant as well. While the coefficients are positive amongst the first set of supply variables in all regressions, only the coefficient on the variable controlling for publicly traded firms is marginally significant and only in the tobit regressions. These findings lend support to the hypothesis that supply issues have an impact on observed cash positions, but certainly are not conclusive. One explanation is that perhaps these variables differentiate between firms that have good access to capital versus average access and that supply issues between such firms are not significant. Perhaps, supply issues are more important when analyzing firms with poor access to capital relative to those with average access.
When looking at firms with poorer access, as measured by the second set of supply variables, these firms do indeed carry less cash. This conclusion is derived from the significant coefficient on the variable controlling for those firms that did not apply because they thought they would be turned down. These firms needed cash, supposedly to fund positive NPV projects, and were deterred from doing so, believing their application would be rejected. Intuitively, such firms would be operating below their optimal cash position and the data supports this conclusion. The regression results indicate that such firms hold lower cash amounts equivalent to 3.3% to 4.4% of revenues.
Considering that the average firm holds cash equivalent to seven percent of sales, these findings have economic significance in that firms which are deterred from applying hold nearly fifty percent less cash than an otherwise similar firm that has not been deterred from applying. These results suggest that information asymmetry leads firms to not apply for funds when positive NPV projects are available, and has a significant effect on a firm's cash position. Such supply problems force firms to operate significantly below their optimal cash position.
When looking at firms with a poor credit history, all of the variables signifying a poor credit mark tend to lower the amount of cash held by the firm, although only two of them are marginally significant. This finding indicates that reputation may play a role in cash holdings through the ability of the firm to obtain capital. The two that appear statistically significant is the control for those owners or firms that have been delinquent.
Such firms hold lower cash amounts equivalent to 1.57% and 1.28% of revenue respectively under the OLS and tobit regressions. To further test the role of reputation, I
combine these four variables into one. Since any one of them may create difficulty in obtaining credit and therefore have a similar impact on actual cash holdings, I consider a firm that fits into at least one of these four variables to have a bad credit mark. The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 indicate the results when the four individual variables are replaced by this new indicator variable. My conjecture seems supported by the data. Not only is the variable more significant statistically, but the coefficient is slightly larger as well. The estimated coefficients suggest that firms having at least one of these poor credit marks hold less cash equivalent to 1.6% to 2.1% of revenues, under the OLS and tobit regressions respectively. Thus reputation, as measured by poor credit use in the past, clearly impacts the firm's cash position.
An element that may also positively or negatively influence observed cash holdings is whether the firm has a line of credit. Such firms have access to a substitute for cash since a line of credit provides cash when the firm needs it, therefore providing the same benefits without having to hold cash. As a substitute, such firms should hold less cash since the marginal benefit of cash is lower than for firms without a line of credit. However, having a line of credit is correlated with past capital access, improving the supply of cash, and may therefore positively influence cash holdings. According to the regressions in Table 3 , the coefficient is negative, but insignificant. However, when alternative measures of supply are included in the regressions, presented in Table 4 , the coefficient is significant. At -1.31% in the first regression, the estimate suggests that a firm with a line of credit holds less cash equivalent to 1.31% of sales if they have a line of credit. This finding is additional evidence that capital market access is an important determinant of cash holdings and that firms respond to better access by holding less cash since the marginal benefit of holding cash is lower as their perceived access in the future improves.
I also examine two other broad measures, which may be related to the degree of information asymmetry between the firm and capital markets, firm age and firm size.
Older firms should have a longer history of capital market transactions as well as of successful operations which should, all else equal, give them a better reputation and an improvement in the amount of information the markets have about such firms.
Therefore, these firms should receive a lower marginal benefit from cash, as raising capital when needed should be easier, therefore lowering their demand for cash.
Alternatively, these firms should be operating closer to their optimal cash positions, since the supply of cash available to these firms should be greater. Therefore, the hypothesized effect of firm age on cash holdings is uncertain. Large firms are not at the upper tail either, possibly because they receive fewer benefits to holding cash, such as facing less of an information asymmetry or due to the transactions costs element. This suggests that there may be two types of small firms, those that are rationed and those that are not, whereas there is only one type of large firms, which are not rationed.
According to the regression results, both of these coefficients are significant, but with different signs. Older firms carry more cash, indicating that older firms may indeed have a lesser degree of information asymmetry between itself and the market, leading to a larger supply of cash allowing them to operate closer to their optimal cash position.
Clearly, an alternative explanation is a survivorship bias in that firms with more cash may be more likely to survive, which means that the set of older firms in the sample would be expected to have higher average cash holdings than the average young firm. However, these explanations are not mutually exclusive. It may be that the older firms with a lesser degree of information asymmetry, relative to their no-longer-existing counterparts (older firms with high levels of information asymmetry), were able to better obtain their optimal cash position and therefore make continued investments, which allowed them to survive.
Looking at the coefficient on size, measured as the natural log of revenues, the coefficient is negative and significant, as was found by Opler et al. This finding indicates that the economies of scale element, due to decreased marginal benefits or fixed transactions costs, dominates any information issues which may have improved the available supply of capital. It also indicates that if there are indeed two types of small firms, those that are rationed and those that are not, that the control variables for the rationed firms seem to be picking up those effects, leaving an unambiguous directional finding for the size coefficient.
Thus information asymmetries appear to have a significant impact on the cash holdings of firms. Those that anticipate facing difficulty in obtaining capital in the future when they will need it have higher cash balances, a finding that provides evidence that firms perceive a benefit from holding cash for precautionary purposes. However, firms may be operating significantly away from their optimal cash holdings due to supply restrictions. Firms that are publicly traded and have easier access to capital hold more cash relative to those not publicly traded. Firms that have been deterred from applying for credit, fearing rejection hold less cash, suggesting that they are operating further from their optimal position due to credit access difficulties in the past. Finally, firms that have, or whose owners have, handled their past credit relationships poorly hold less cash, also suggesting that they are operating further from their optimal cash positions due to supply frictions that result from information asymmetries.
B. Costs of Financial Distress
The factors that make debt costly, such as bankruptcy costs and losses in asset values, are generally classified as costs of financial distress. These same factors are what make holding cash beneficial, as higher cash holdings decrease the likelihood of missing a required debt payment and therefore lower the probability of financial distress.
However, cash serves a similar beneficial role in firms without debt in their capital structure. Since firms may face a mispricing in raising funds, regardless of their capital structure, they may forego positive NPV projects, as suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984) , giving rise to the theory of a pecking-order in funding capital expenditures, with cash as the least expensive form of funding. Therefore, we would expect that a firm's cash holdings increase as its costs of financial distress increase, so as to decrease the likelihood of entering distress.
These theoretical benefits are indeed present in practice. As illustrated in Table 3, as the outstanding loan balance as a percentage of revenues increases, so does the cash holdings of the firm. Thus, as firms increase their borrowing, they also increase the amount of cash they hold on reserve, consistent with avoiding financial distress. By raising their cash holdings, they decrease the likelihood of not having enough cash on hand to make a required interest payment, therefore lowering the probability of entering distress.
This coefficient is economically significant as well. It suggests that for every dollar increase in outstanding loans, the firm increases the amount of cash it holds by four cents. Even when the upper tail of cash over earnings is truncated at one, the coefficient on loans to revenue stays significant at an increase of three cents in cash holdings for every increase of one dollar in outstanding loans. This finding suggests that financial distress costs are an important element in determining the firm's optimal cash holdings.
This finding is contrary to that found by Opler et al. They find a negative coefficient on their measure of leverage, which is total debt over assets, as opposed to this measure, which is total debt over sales. They suggest that their finding is consistent with higher leverage firms "not hav [ing] valuable investment opportunities that they would lose in the absence of cash holdings." Essentially, they argue that leverage and cash are jointly determined and that firms that would have lower marginal benefits to holding cash, firms without investment opportunities, are the same firms that also have high leverage. The lack of consistency in the role of leverage suggests possibly that the firms in the different samples have different investment opportunities and therefore have different marginal tradeoffs with respect to cash and leverage.
However, there are two alternative explanations that may explain the negative coefficient found among this sample of firms. The first is that a firm with more loans outstanding simply carries more cash because they have higher interest expense and therefore carry the cash due to month-to-month liquidity needs. However, the regressions I report all contain a variable of total expenses over sales in order to pick up any effects that may be attributable to this liquidity type of argument. Interest expense is contained within this variable, but is not independently reported, and should therefore capture such effects.
A second alternative is that firms with higher loan balances carry higher cash balances simply because these firms recently raised money, causing both the cash balance and loan balance to increase, and simply have not yet used all the funds raised. Dummy variables for those firms that received a loan in the past year or in the past two years are included in unreported regressions to address this possibility. If those firms that have received funds recently are driving the positive coefficient on the loan-to-sales ratio, then the coefficient on the dummy variable signifying those firms that have recently received funds from new loans is expected to be positive. However, the coefficients on such variables come out significantly negative, contrary to the direction suggested, but the coefficient on loans to sales is unchanged. Thus it is not the firms that have recently raised funds that are causing the coefficient on loans to be positive. The negative coefficient indicates that firms that recently raised debt funds have lower cash balances relative to firms that have not raised debt funds recently, suggesting that they have used the funds from their most recent loan. These findings lend further support to my initial suggestion that the positive coefficient on loan balances is reflective of firms holding more cash to offset the higher probability of financial distress that occurs as a firm becomes more levered.
An alternative measure related to costs of financial distress is the amount of research and development in which the firm is engaged. Many papers in the empirical corporate finance literature have used such a variable as a proxy for financial distress costs. (Titman and Wessels (1988) and Opler and Titman (1994) for example) One reason for this is that in times of distress, firms may cut spending on R&D, which can be equivalent to cutting investment in positive NPV projects. Therefore, firms intensely engaged in research and development might be those firms that would endure the largest losses should they become distressed. However, such cuts may not just be the result of having debt in the capital structure. Indeed a firm may have no debt in their capital structure but may still face difficulty raising funds to conduct R&D and still forego such positive NPV projects. Therefore holding more cash as the amount of research and development increases is meaningful for all firms, regardless of capital structure.
This conjecture holds in the data. I control for R&D in two ways, a dummy variable indicating that the firm does R&D and a variable indicating the percentage of the firm's employees who are engaged in research and development. As shown in Table 3, how engaged the firm is in R&D is another important determinant of how much cash is held by the firm. Firms that are more research oriented carry significantly more cash than those firms that are not. Indeed, the coefficient indicates that a firm in which fifty percent of the employees are engaged in R&D, carry additional cash equivalent to 4.6% of annual sales relative to a firm that does no R&D. When we consider that the average firm in the sample has cash holdings equivalent to 7.1% of sales, this finding suggests that a firm where half the employees are engaged in research and development carry nearly 65% more cash than an otherwise equivalent firm that does not.
Simply doing some research does not increase the amount of cash held. The dummy variable indicating that a firm does have at least one employee conducting R&D is not significant, although positive as expected. Thus it is the amount of R&D in which the firm is engaged that carries an effect, not simply that the firm does more R&D. This finding makes intuitive sense as well. If indeed R&D proxies for a loss in value due to a reduction in the investment in positive NPV projects that may occur in times of low cash, then it is the scale of these projects that would determine the level of cash holdings, not merely the presence of projects.
A robustness check on these findings is to look at the combination of leverage and R&D. All firms engaged in research receive higher marginal benefits from cash than those firms that do not. However, firms engaged in intense research should receive even higher marginal benefits from cash as their leverage increases. As leverage increases for these firms that have high financial distress costs, so does their probability of distress.
Therefore cash balances should increase more as the intensity of the research increases for high leverage firms than for low leverage firms. Table 5 presents results when the intensity of research is divided into two groups, the amount of research conducted by high leverage firms and the amount of research conducted by low leverage firms. High leverage is defined as having a ratio of loans to sales in excess of ten percent. As evidenced by the statistically significant coefficient on both terms, the intensity of research increases cash holdings for both low leverage and high leverage firms. However, the coefficient on the research term for high leverage firms is more than twice the coefficient found for low leverage firms and the difference between the coefficients is statistically significant. Economically, these coefficients imply that a firm with low leverage increases their cash holdings by 2.5% of sales as they increase from no research to having fifty percent of their employees engaged in research.
In comparison, a high leverage firm increases their cash holdings by 6.5% of sales for the same increase in research intensity. High leverage firms appear more concerned about financial distress costs, because such leverage increases their likelihood of encountering distress, and respond by holding more cash relative to less levered firms.
Thus the data support the hypothesis that cash is held for preventative purposes, and does provide the theorized benefits. Firms with higher amounts of leverage who may be concerned about confronting financial distress hold more cash. Additionally, those firms that would theoretically derive the most benefit from carrying cash, firms who are investing in positive NPV projects such as R&D, hold significantly more cash than their counterparts that are engaged in less R&D.
C. Agency Costs
The presence of agency costs is another friction that may affect cash holdings. Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss the alignment of incentives between managers and shareholders as share ownership by the manager increases. Jensen (1986) furthers this idea by incorporating the role of cash holdings, concluding that available cash in firms with low managerial ownership increases agency costs since the firm can incur such costs without further scrutiny by the capital markets. However, it is also possible that agency costs can be controlled by better monitoring from outside shareholders. As the percentage owned by the largest shareholder increases, we would expect there to be greater incentive for that shareholder to engage in monitoring that would control costs.
Therefore, as ownership by the largest shareholder increases, regardless of whether that shareholder is the manager or not, we would expect agency costs to drop. One way the shareholder may control such costs is to leave less cash in the firm. However, the effect of concentrated ownership may go either direction. Larger ownership stakes by the largest shareholder may give him more power, which he uses to remove the temptation of free cash from within the firm by lowering cash balances. However, such owners should have more control and be better able to control agency costs therefore not needing to remove such cash. In fact it may be those firms with diffuse ownership that have less cash because the owners feel that they cannot control agency costs directly and therefore remove cash from the firm to control these costs indirectly.
I analyze the effects of ownership and control on cash holdings by including variables indicating the percentage owned by the largest shareholder and indicating if the largest shareholder is also the manager. As indicated in Table 3 , the coefficient on managerial ownership is significantly negative, suggesting that cash holdings decline as the ownership of the largest shareholder increases. This finding is consistent with managers removing cash from the firms in order to avoid using these funds for negative NPV projects and the ability of the largest owner to remove this cash increases with his ownership share. The results in the table also indicate that the owner's ability to remove cash from the firm is not affected by his role as the manager. Firms where the manager is also the owner do not have significantly different cash holdings relative to firms in which the largest shareholder is not the manager.
However, an alternative story may be that the reason we find this correlation is that larger ownership stakes by the largest shareholder may be correlated with tightly held firms which as a result of having fewer shareholders, may have fewer sources of capital. Therefore the finding that these firms have lower cash may simply result because there is less cash infusion from fewer shareholders and that these firms may not want more shareholders, for corporate governance reasons, or have attempted to raise additional equity and been unsuccessful. This is a supply side element that may explain the results. In the regressions reported in Table 6 , the log of one plus the number of shareholders is added in the regressions and the coefficient on ownership is no longer significant. What seems to matter is the number of shareholders, an alternative measure of diffuseness. Firms with more shareholders have more cash, which can be interpreted as less monitoring due to the greater diffusion of ownership leading to leaving more cash in the firm. However, the alternative explanation that it is simply a supply side implication cannot be discounted.
As another check on the presence of agency costs and their impact on cash holdings, I include a variable combining profits and ownership share to determine how ownership affects the decision to retain earnings. In the absence of agency costs, the choice to retain or distribute cash from earnings should be independent of the ownership structure. However, if agency costs are present, firms with high profits and concentrated ownership should have lower agency costs than firms with high profits and less concentrated ownership. The level of agency costs may be correlated with observed cash holdings because the cash retained in the firm funds such agency costs. As ownership becomes concentrated, the cash may be more likely to be removed from the firm to avoid these costs. Put another way, when ownership is disperse, the manager may want to keep funds in the firm for the purpose of private consumption, whereas when ownership becomes more concentrated, these costs are more internalized by the largest ownership which increases the motivation of that owner to remove excess cash from the firm. Since the profit margin should be positively correlated with the excess cashflow of the firm, I
add a variable equal to the product of the profit margin of the firm and the ownership share of the largest shareholder to empirically test this conjecture. As reported in Table 6 , the coefficient on this term is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that as ownership becomes increasingly concentrated, profits are less likely to be retained in the firm in the form of cash.
This explanation regarding the incentives to remove cash from the firm seems more about control than ownership. I argue that as ownership increases, the incentives are greater to remove the cash from the firm, but this is contingent on the owner with the largest stake being able to induce the distribution of these funds. It may be more likely that firms where the largest owner is also the manager are the firms where the owner has the control to remove such funds. Put differently, it may be that in firms where the owner is not the manager, the professional manager may be less willing to distribute earnings, effectively lowering the amount of cash available to fund agency costs. Therefore, I split the variable interacting profit and ownership in two with the first interacting the profit margin with the ownership share for the largest owner when he is also the manager. The second variable interacts the profit margin with the ownership share of the largest shareholder for those firms in which the largest shareholder is not the manager.
When the interaction term is split as such, only one of the coefficients is significant, the term on the variable interacting profit margin with the ownership percentage of the owner-manager. The negative coefficient indicates that for profitable firms where the manager has the largest ownership stake, earnings are less likely to be retained in the firm as that ownership stake increases. However the lack of significance on the interaction term for firms where the largest owner is not the manager, indicates that it is not ownership structure that is leading to the earnings dispersal, but rather the control of the owner manager. For firms with less concentrated ownership or a professional manager, earnings are more likely to be retained as cash than for those firms where ownership is concentrated in the hands of the manager. This finding is consistent with managers who internalize less of the costs of engaging in negative NPV projects that provide personal benefits wanting to retain more of the profits to finance such expenditures.
D. Taxes
One other friction that may have an impact on cash holdings is taxes. A large component of the corporate finance literature focuses on the firm value increase that results from debt in the capital structure attributable to the more favorable tax treatment of debt payments relative to equity payments. Since cash can in some respect be thought of as negative debt, it should not be surprising that the inclusion of taxes theoretically Additionally, this variable is statistically insignificant. In unreported regressions, I also look at just those C-Corps which report having actually paid taxes and control for firms which have more than fifty shareholders since another important distinction between C-Corps and S-Corps is that S-Corps are limited to less than fifty shareholders. Still, the coefficient is statistically insignificant.
Thus, corporate form differences do not appear to be significant determinants of cash holdings.
This finding however is not surprising when one considers the magnitude of the taxes on interest income. For the sample, mean cash holdings are seven percent of sales;
interest income would be a small percentage of that seven percent, and the taxes on that interest income would be an extremely small percentage of sales. Therefore, while theoretically an issue, that magnitude of the effect of double taxation appears too small to have a significant impact on observed cash holdings.
Conclusion
Issues of information asymmetry and costs of financial distress play important roles in the determination of cash holdings for small firms. Those companies that have more leverage and conduct more research and development hold comparatively more cash, as a percentage of sales, than firms with less leverage or conduct little or no research activities. Firms that perceive difficulty in raising cash in the future hold more cash relative to those that do not. However, many firms appear to be operating below their optimal cash position due to past difficulties in accessing capital. Specifically, firms that have been deterred from applying for capital as well as those which have, or whose managers have, handled their credit poorly in the past also hold relatively less cash.
Agency costs affect the amount of earnings retained by the firm as evidenced by the difference in the percentage of earnings retained as cash as the ownership percentage of the largest shareholder increases and as there is a difference in this measure between owner-managed and non-owner-managed firms. Taxes appear to have little explanatory power in determining cash holdings.
These findings are important because they confirm the presence and impacts of financial frictions on the cash holdings of small firms. This matters because to date, they have only been documented for larger firms. In addition, they provide for interesting comparisons when combined with the findings for large, publicly traded firms. Similar findings are that firms engaged in research hold more cash and as mentioned earlier, both groups demonstrate declining relative cash holdings as size increases within the respective samples. However, cash holdings relative to sales are larger for large firms than for small firms. Combined, these findings suggest a discrete increase in cash holdings as we move from the small firms in this sample to the larger, publicly traded firms. This difference could be due to differences in access to capital between the two samples, which I document as illustrated by the statistically significant and positive coefficient for the variable controlling for the publicly traded firms in my sample.
The difference in past access to capital and perceived future access has interesting implications within the two samples. I find that firms perceiving greater information asymmetry and a greater corresponding difficulty in obtaining capital in the future results in firms having higher cash holdings relative to their sales. However, firms that have had difficulty in the past raising funds hold less cash. Opler et al. document that firms with greater information asymmetry, as measured by not having a debt rating, hold more cash.
They reason that these firms are most likely to face a mispricing in the future and therefore receive a higher marginal benefit from holding cash. In that sample, such information asymmetry has apparently not hampered these firms from obtaining that additional cash while similar small firms in my sample have been so hampered. This distinction suggests that smaller firms do face outright credit rationing and that it is important to control separately for future access as opposed to past access in examining the cash holdings of smaller firms.
Another important difference is that smaller firms tend to hold more cash as leverage increases whereas larger firms with high leverage tend to hold less cash than large firm with low leverage. This distinction is consistent with different credit access.
If larger firms can more easily obtain cash when they need it, then the marginal benefit of holding cash is small and is better utilized by paying down debt. However, since smaller firms have a more difficult time accessing credit, the marginal value of holding that cash appears greater than the marginal benefit of paying down debt, yielding the positive coefficient for this group.
Table 1 -Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics for the firms in my sample. The firms are divided by industry in the top half of the panel and averages are given for those industries. The bottom half divides the sample into deciles, ranked by the ratio of Cash Holdings to Sales. "Does R&D" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has any employees engaged in R&D while "Percent R&D" corresponds to the percentage of the firm's employees who conduct research and development. "Credit Problem" is also a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm lists credit access its biggest problem in the next 12 months. Revenue is stated in thousands. This table presents the results of regressions describing cash holdings of the firms in my sample. The first column is standard ordinary least squares while column 2 is a tobit with a lower truncation at zero and the third column is a tobit with both a lower truncation at zero and an upper truncation at one. The dependent variable is the ratio of Cash to Sales. *, **, and *** correspond to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
(1) This table examines the ratio of Cash to Sales and includes variables affecting the supply of cash available to firms. The first and third columns are ordinary least squares while the second and fourth are tobits with upper truncations at one and lower truncations at zero. "Bad Credit Mark" is a dummy variable indicating that any one of the four variables "Has Declared Bankruptcy", "Owner Has Been Delinquent", "Firm Has Been Delinquent", or "Judgments Against Owner" are true. *, **, and *** correspond to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. This table presents regressions with alternative measures of financial distress. The dependent variable is Cash over Sales. The independent variables are those listed in the table but also include all those found in the first two columns in Table 4 . The first and third columns are ordinary least squares while second and fourth are tobit regressions with lower truncations at zero and upper truncations at one. High leverage is defined as having Loans over Sales in excess of ten percent, while low leverage firms have a ratio below ten percent. *, **, and *** correspond to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. Table 4 . The first interaction variable in the third column takes value zero when the largest shareholder is not the zero, the product of profit margin and ownership percentage of the largest owner otherwise. The second interaction variable in the third column takes the value zero when the largest shareholder is the manager and the product of the profit margin and ownership share of the largest owner otherwise. *, **, and *** correspond to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
(1) 
